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Corporate elites are increasingly held responsible for issues of sustainability including 
working conditions and workers’ rights in global production networks. We still know 
relatively little about how they respond to concrete stakeholder initiatives aiming to restrict 
corporate voluntarism through transnational regulation. In this chapter we report comparative 
findings on corporate legitimation strategies in response to requests by labor representatives 
to sign Global Framework Agreements (GFAs). These agreements are intended to hold 
multinational corporations (MNCs) accountable for the implementation of core labor 
standards across their supply chains. We propose to broaden management-focused analyses of 
corporate legitimation strategies by applying a field-oriented perspective that considers the 
embeddedness of management in a broader web of strategic activity and variable opportunity 
structures. Our findings suggest that legitimation strategies are developed dynamically along 
with the rules, positions, and understandings developing around specific regulatory issues in 




As indicated by the proliferation of terms such as perception and impression 
management, public affairs management, or corporate social responsibility, legitimizing 
corporate activities vis-à-vis external expectations has become an important management 
activity that goes beyond traditional public relations (e.g. Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Strike, 
Gao, & Bansal, 2006). Multinational corporations (MNCs) in particular are increasingly 
scrutinized by civil society groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) criticizing 
the violation of labor rights or environmental standards. Given that activities of MNCs extend 
across national jurisdictions, corporate elites are confronted by multiple efforts to regulate 
their behavior on a transnational level (Waddock, 2008). And yet, in the absence of a state-
like authority, corporations are also called upon to participate in creating, shaping and 
enforcing emerging environmental and social regulations (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011).  
On the one hand, corporate elites try to exploit the existence of multiple regulatory 
initiatives by avoiding any binding regulation or shifting towards a forum in which rules are 
set that are in line with their interests (Quack, 2013). On the other hand, corporate elites 
cannot take their influence within organizational domains or on regulatory policies for granted 
because different actors, among them even small NGOs and social movements, can raise 
challenges that make transnational fields contested and fluid (Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson, 
2006; Djelic & Quack, 2008). Scherer and colleagues (2013) have recently argued that in 
complex global environments corporations use three different, and at times contradictory, 
legitimation strategies: adaptation, manipulation, and moral reasoning. In so doing, they seek 
to account for heterogeneity and dynamism in stakeholder expectations, appeasing or co-
opting challengers while preserving as much autonomy as possible. While Scherer and 
colleagues (2013) discuss how organizations intend to cope with the paradoxical tensions 
posed by such an approach, they do not study the dynamic interplay and resultant shift in the 
corporate elites’ legitimation strategies over time within a specific field of regulation.  
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In this paper, we address this gap by studying how corporate elites dynamically adjust 
their legitimation strategies in response to legitimacy threats in the field of transnational labor 
regulation emerging around Global Framework Agreements (GFAs). GFAs are company-
based agreements codifying MNCs’ commitment to comply with core labor standards defined 
by the International Labor Organization (ILO) across their supply chains. They are negotiated 
and signed by Global Union Federations (GUFs) and top management representatives. As 
such, they can be regarded as a joint attempt of MNCs and civil society actors – specifically 
trade unions and their global federations – to regulate labor relations transnationally and to 
monitor compliance. Similar to other attempts regulating transnational sustainability issues 
(Palazzo & Scherer, 2006), the actual impact of such negotiated agreements for workers at the 
bottom of the pyramid is still unclear. However, the range of elite reactions to GFAs indicate 
that such agreements have the potential to effectively challenge corporate elites' positions in 
the field of labor regulation. GFAs thus provide a rich empirical setting in which to analyze 
how legitimation strategies of corporate elites evolve through the interaction with challenging 
actors in contested transnational regulatory fields. 
In only two cases of our sample of 12 MNCs engaging in GFA negotiations corporate 
elites changed their legitimation strategy and shifted from initial resistance towards 
engagement in moral reasoning with corporate challengers. In the other cases, MNCs only 
marginally changed their legitimation strategies from resistance towards selective adaptation 
of GFAs or manipulation of the agreements in order to avoid an actual change in behavior. 
The extent of change and type of legitimation strategy adopted depended on the enactment of 
opportunity structures provided by transnational institutional heterogeneity, established 
patterns of national labor relations, and specific actor constellations. Thus, our study suggests 
that legitimation strategies need to be understood as developing out of a process of 
contestation embedded in and impacting on the rules, positions and understandings around a 
substantive domain of regulation. 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Corporate Elites in Transnational Regulatory Fields 
Transnational regulatory arrangements have emerged in different contexts, ranging from the 
realm of professional services (e.g. Suddaby et al., 2007) and financial markets (e.g. Mayntz, 
2012) to that of various social and environmental standards (e.g. Overdevest, 2010). They 
tend to be driven predominantly by private actors such as corporations and NGOs (e.g. 
Bartley, 2005) but are also impacted by public actors, i.e. governments and international 
organizations (e.g. Schüßler et al., 2014). In any case, transnational regulation always 
involves negotiations and struggles among a diverse set of actors with conflicting interests, 
thereby leading to reconfigurations of rule-setting authority between public and private actors 
(Botzem and Hofmann, 2010). Central questions in researching transnational regulation thus 
revolve around who is able to claim and provide legitimacy for rule-setting and monitoring, as 
well as how other actors in the field respond to these activities (Dezalay and Garth, 2008; 
Quack, 2010; Zürn, 2004). 
 Although we know less about the power resources of corporate elites on a 
transnational level, we know from national contexts that corporate leaders commonly have 
command over financial and often social capital that allows them to influence important 
policy decisions (Mills, 1956; Useem, 1984). As recent evidence shows, transnational elites 
are firmly embedded in national arenas (Carroll, 2009). Such power is often considered 
structural, based as it is on connections to elite networks and public agencies (e.g. Barley, 
2007; 2010; Davis, 1991; Davis and Greve, 1997; Davis and Mizruchi, 1999; Mizruchi, 2004, 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). Equally, institutions like corporate law, property rights, 
professions, or social customs (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Hensmans, 2003; Lawrence, 
2008) are important elements of national elites' power resources. At the transnational level, 
elite studies using structural network analyses have identified similar groups and overlaps, 
mainly between European and North American corporations given shared activities on 
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transnational boards (Carroll and Sapinski, 2010). While these studies shed some light on the 
potential of corporate elites to influence transnational regulatory processes, they largely 
neglect contestation dynamics in which management practices are being challenged by 
outside actors.  
A field-level approach is useful to capture these dynamics because it recognizes the 
fluidity of elites in today’s globalized, post-industrial society in which legitimate influence is 
the outcome of specific interaction patterns in complex webs of relationships (Bernstein, 
2011; Malets & Quack, 2013; Quack, 2013; Harvey & Maclean, 2010). Regulatory fields 
typically form around a contested issue and evolve as actors struggle over the rules, positions, 
and understandings dominating the field (Hardy & Phillips, 1998; Hoffman, 1999; Levy, 
2008; Rao et al., 2000). Business actors participate in these fields in various guises, so we 
define corporate elites broadly as going beyond the directors of the world’s largest 500 
corporations who sit on at least two G500 directorates (cf. Carroll, 2009) to also include the 
supportive stratum of managers occupying positions below the peak level (cf. Kerr & 
Robinson, 2012), as well as a host of professional business consultants, policy advisors and 
representatives from business associations involved in shaping emerging regulations (Zald & 
Lounsbury, 2010).  
Corporate elites are regularly drawn into contest over the rules, positions, and 
understandings around specific regulatory issues by challengers in the form of advocacy 
coalitions and social movements (e.g. Lounsbury et al., 2003; McAdam and Scott, 2005). 
Such “strategic action fields” are characterized by dynamism and change, because actors 
“make moves and other actors have to interpret them, consider their options, and act. Actors 
who are both more and less powerful are constantly making adjustments to the conditions in 
the field given their position and the actions of others.” (Fligstein and McAdam, 2011: 5). 
Yet, despite this dynamic conception of strategic agency, actors’ positions are still often 
considered as relatively static, with challengers thought to populate niches in the field that 
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ordinarily wield little influence (Fligstein and McAdam, 2011: 6). Both corporate elites and 
challenging groups, however, need to socially construct and fight for their positions in a 
regulatory arena through the use and dynamic adjustment of legitimation strategies (Dezalay 
& Garth, 2010: 117).   
 
2.2 Towards a Field-Oriented Analysis of Legitimation Strategies 
Legitimacy can be understood as a “generalized perception or assumption that the actions of 
an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995: 574). As such, legitimacy is 
important for all organizations, because it allows them to acquire material and human 
resources necessary to survive (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994), grow (Khaire, 2010), and change 
(Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). Much of the research on organizational legitimation 
strategies has focused on the discursive, rhetorical efforts of organizations to rationalize, 
normalize, or theorize their actions vis-à-vis opponents and the wider public. Corporations, 
for instance, use legitimation strategies to gain acceptance for organizational changes such as 
restructuring and downsizing (e.g. Vaara et al., 2006; Erkama & Vaara, 2010). However, 
legitimacy not only depends on managing public perception, it also rests on the underlying 
socially constructed system of norms and formal regulations against which such perceptions 
of legitimacy are defined and challenged. Legitimacy is thus closely tied to the hegemony of 
those who shape rule systems and demand rule following (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 2003).  
The groundwork for research on corporate legitimation strategies has been laid by 
Oliver (1991), who outlines five possible strategic responses to external expectation: 
acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance, and manipulation. Building on this concept, 
efforts to gain, maintain or repair legitimacy are often broadly classified as either strategic, 
that is, oriented towards the manipulation of symbols and meaning structures, or institutional, 
8 
oriented towards adapting to external expectations (Suchman, 1995). In transnational fields, 
however, there is no commonly shared, stable set of cultural or normative expectations that 
can serve as a reference point for established legitimation strategies. Instead, organizations – 
and MNCs and their corporate elites in particular – seek to justify their practices and 
procedures through processes of moral reasoning with diverse stakeholders (Palazzo and 
Scherer 2006; Suchman 1995). Unlike manipulation tactics that are oriented towards 
imposing ones’ view over others, Scherer and colleagues (2013) consider moral reasoning as 
an open-ended discursive process that involves learning and adaptation by incumbents and 
challengers alike. However, moral reasoning is often employed alongside adaptation and 
manipulation strategies, and the resulting patterns of legitimation strategies lack empirical 
elaboration to date.  
Moral reasoning and emerging regulations also provide challengers with new options by 
which to question the corporate elites' legitimacy. For instance, sports manufacturers like 
Puma or Adidas have adapted to the new behavioral standard established by competitor Nike 
in increasing supply chain transparency, at the same time engaging in a stakeholder dialogue 
and trying to manipulate public perception with regard to environmental issues (Scherer et al., 
2013). In one of the few existing studies examining sequences of interactions between 
corporations and challenging groups, Bartley (2003, 2007) finds that corporate responses to 
labor rights campaigns changed from the symbolic adoption of Codes of Conduct to the 
establishment of independent monitoring bodies in order to defend their legitimacy in the face 
of ongoing stakeholder pressure. Thus, transnational regulatory fields are like other fields a 
space of possibilities (cf. Bourdieu 1985: 737) for both corporate elites and challenging actors 
in which opportunity structures are created and enacted dynamically in specific actor 
constellations and with regard to specific regulatory issues. 
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3. Empirical Study: Regulating Labor Relations through Global Framework 
Agreements 
3.1  Research Setting 
We draw on empirical data from a large, multi-country study of the emerging field of 
regulating transnational labor relations through Global Framework Agreements (GFAs) 
(Fichter et al. 2013a,b, 2012 a,b, 2011; Fichter & Helfen, 2011; Fichter & Stevis, 2013; 
Helfen & Fichter, 2013; Helfen & Sydow 2013; Helfen et al. 2012; Arruda et al. 2012; 
Gartenberg and Bandekar, 2011).1 The starting point of this research is that GFAs are signed 
between GUFs and MNCs to implement core ILO labor standards2 across MNCs’ global 
operations, often including suppliers and joint ventures in the production network (Fichter et 
al., 2011). GFAs represent a form of regulation situated between voluntary standards (like 
corporate Codes of Conduct) and international law. They are distinct from accreditation and 
certification schemes in that they are based on institutionalized mechanisms of labor 
representation and interest aggregation (Kocher, 2008; Mund & Priegnitz, 2007; Hammer 
2005). For GUFs, GFAs provide an opportunity to influence global labor standards by 
bilateral, direct dealings with MNCs, as opposed to attempts to influence standards indirectly 
via the ILO whose conventions are directed at nation states and do not have MNCs as 
immediate addressees. GFAs thus promise a considerable, strategically important benefit for 
GUFs to contribute to the extension of industrial human rights, e.g. the right to form 
independent unions or the right to bargain collectively throughout MNCs’ global operations. 
Additionally, GUFs see GFAs as an opportunity for securing their own recognition as a 
                                                          
1  This work was supported by the Hans-Böckler-Foundation [grant number S-2008-141-2 B]. 
Additional support and technical assistance was provided by the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation [no grant 
number]. 
2  The core labour standards refer to the prohibition of child labour (ILO co. 138 and 182) and 
forced labour (ILO co. 29 and 105), to non-discrimination and equal pay (ILO co. 100 and 111), and to 
freedom of association and collective bargaining (ILO co. 87 and 98). 
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legitimate negotiation partner, since GFAs are, in many cases, the first instances in which 
MNC accept these union bodies as negotiating on behalf of employees (Fichter et al. 2013a). 
The transnational business community, represented through bodies like the International 
Organization of Employers (IOE) or the European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERI), tends to 
disregard GFAs as an appropriate instrument through which to regulate labor relations. 
According to our interviews with representatives from these bodies, there is no consensus on 
supporting GFAs ideationally or actively. If individual MNCs sign a GFA, the issue is 
tolerated by way of taking a skeptical, but neutral stance. The vast majority of the 
approximately 80.000 MNCs (UNCTAD) have still not signed a GFA and thus, by and large, 
follow a strategy of voluntarism. MNCs for their part typically either do not perceive deficits 
in labor relations as an urgent issue, are entirely satisfied with a unilateral (CSR) approach, or 
are not convinced that GFAs bring a reliable solution for labor problems. Most MNCs follow 
a strategy of voluntary self-regulation in the form of Codes of Conduct, encompassing but not 
focusing on labor-related matters (Bartley, 2005). The corporate elite is in a favorable position 
in cross-border economic exchanges because social movement pressure by unions is weak, 
governments do not enforce workers’ rights, and the transnational regulatory body (i.e. the 
ILO) lacks sanction-based enforcement mechanisms.  
Nevertheless, a combination of reputation concerns due to high visibility in consumer 
markets, CSR policies, the tradition of cooperative labor relations at headquarters, and union 
pressure can increase the willingness of individual MNCs to sign a GFA (e.g. Helfen and 
Fichter, 2013; Helfen et al. 2012). The large majority of the 118 GFAs signed from the mid 
1990s up until the end of 2013 have been negotiated with MNCs from continental Western 
Europe (21 Germany, 17 Scandinavia, 13 France, 12 Southern Europe, 9 Benelux), although 
the last five years have seen a slow increase in the number of agreements with MNCs whose 
headquarters are located in other parts of the world such as the USA, South Africa, Brazil, 
Japan, Canada, Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand (s. Table 1). 
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Sectors Total No. of GFAs *) 






industry, machine tool 
& metal engineering, 
apparel and textiles  
43 5 
UNI global union 
Telecommunication, 
Retailing, Commerce, 
Property and facility 
services, Temporary 
work agencies, printing 





materials, woodworking  
17 - 
IUF Hotels & catering,  food & beverages  8 3 
Total 
 118 24 
Notes: *) as counted in terms of signing MNCs, **) The total number of agreements 
within the domain of UNI is difficult to assess. UNI self-declares to have signed its 50th 
agreement in 2013. Due to various reasons, however, the actual number of GFAs is very 
likely to be lower. For example, many of the Non-European agreements have only a 
restricted geographical scope; mergers, acquisitions and liquidations have reduced the 
agreements still effective; some agreements lack in substantive jurisdiction; ***) the 
Public Service International has also been involved in negotiating GFAs, but always as a 
co-signatory to IndustriAll, ***) containing all GFAs originally signed by IMF, ICEM and 
ITGWLF. 
 
GFAs are company-specific, but are rooted in a wider transnational regulatory field in which 
nationally embedded and globally operating actor groups and networks struggle for influence 
on the employment policies and practices of MNCs. This "GFA arena" (Helfen & Fichter, 
2013: 556) is similar to other transnational regulatory fields in its multiple layers of regulation 
(Djelic and Quack, 2003; Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, 2006; Djelic and Quack, 2010; 
Morgan & Kristensen 2006): policy processes related to ILO standards, the presence of 
regional and national industrial relations institutions and legacies, and realities of company-
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level formal and informal regulations. In addition, the arena is marked by capital-labor 
antinomy (Helfen & Fichter, 2013; Fichter et al., 2012b). On the labor side, works councils 
(European, world) are involved along with national affiliates and the GUFs. On the 
management side, involvement is usually from HR department heads, industrial relations 
experts, top management, and business associations on different levels.  
Combined, the multi-lateral and multi-level nature of the GFA arena implies complex 
and heterogeneous actor constellations comprising (organized) labor and management actors 
at the transnational level (single MNCs and GUFs), national/sectoral level (national/sector 
unions and employer associations), MNC headquarter level in the home country, and at the 
level of local subsidiaries/suppliers in host countries. As a research setting, GFAs thus allow 
us to observe how corporate legitimation strategies are used and change in line with emerging 
regulations in a complex, multi-layered opportunity structure. 
 
3.2 Data Collection and Analysis  
For this paper, we take a bird's eye perspective on 28 case studies conducted by an 
international research team for GFAs in different GUF domains and in four different countries 
(Brazil, India, USA, Turkey) (e.g. Fichter et al., 2011; Fichter & Helfen, 2011). We re-
interpret and summarize this case study material through the lens of legitimation strategies of 
corporate elites faced with a moral reasoning challenge. We focus in depth on 12 case studies 
from manufacturing industries.  
The original data collection effort between 2008 and 2011 included primary data 
(interviews with both parties of the agreements at the HQ level as well as with selected 
subsidiaries) and a host of secondary data (agreements themselves, interviews with third 
parties like employer associations and NGOs, companies' CSR and sustainability reports, and 
other documents containing general information about the cases). For the interview data, the 
aim was to have at least one interview per actor group and country for MNCs in the domains 
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of four GUFs (now three due to the merger of ICEM, IMF and the ITGWLF to IndustriAll 
(2012)). Within this overall approach, the research team conducted well over 150 semi-
structured interviews (78 interviews with representatives of management and labor at the 
headquarter level and 68 interviews at corporate production sites in India, USA, Brazil and 
Turkey). Taken together, this data material allows us to capture varying perspectives, 
divergent assessments and common evaluations among the most relevant actors, above all, 
MNCs and GUFs across the transnational regulatory field in focus (Arruda et al. 2012; Fichter 
et al. 2011, 2012a, b; Fichter et al. 2013; Fichter and Stevis 2013; Helfen and Sydow 2013).  
Out of all 28 MNCs, 22 already had a signed GFA during the field phase, one signed the 
GFA after the end of 2011, and five have not signed a GFA to date. The 12 cases we focus on 
in this paper are all in the domain of IndustriAll and BWI, actually have a GFA, and are 
empirically captured by at least one pair of interviews with management and labor 
representatives involved in the GFA process. 
 
Table 2: Interview material  
 
GUF Total Sample Subsample IndustriAll BWI 












23 18 16 5 
Unions local 
 45 22 17 5 
Sum 146 80 54 26 
 
Remaining gaps in the data collection process were filled either through secondary 
material or the growing literature on GFAs (e.g. Dehnen, 2013; Williams et al. 2013; Niforou 
2011; Davies et al. 2011; Egels-Zandén 2009; Hammer 2005; for an extensive overview 
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Papadakis 2011).  For the secondary material, we draw on a text analysis of 73 GFAs (as of 
2009). This analysis includes the 12 cases that examine core features of the formal 
agreements, such as parties’ goals, the relationship between the parties, substantive content, 
scope, conflict resolution mechanisms, termination rules, and signatories. In addition, the 
research team examined numerous sources such as policy statements of global union 
federations and employer associations, internet pages and press releases. 
In order to identify typical trajectories – historically rooted pathways resulting from 
repeated interactions (Malets & Quack, 2013) – of how corporate elites respond to the moral 
reasoning challenge posed by GFAs, we draw on thick case descriptions and coding efforts 
developed in different stages of the original research process (see above) to derive an overall 
synthesizing picture for the subsample. We trace MNCs' trajectories from the initial proposal 
by the unions to sign a GFA, through to the preliminary management reaction, ensuing 
respective union responses and finally the subsequent managerial reaction. We have hereby 
applied the three types of corporate legitimation strategies distinguished by Scherer and 
colleagues (2013): moral reasoning, manipulation and adaptation. In presenting our results we 




4.1 Starting Conditions 
Although there are a few exceptions, the ‘typical’ successful GFA negotiation process  
unfolds as follows (s. also Helfen & Sydow 2013): (1) the GUFs (more often than not 
supported and even led by national unions and works councils at the MNC headquarters) try 
to enter into negotiations with MNC management by applying various soft (and, rarely, 
strong) tactics; (2) management usually initially responds by declining the request on several 
grounds, but gives in and starts official negotiations if (3) the union side continues pushing for 
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an agreement; (4) during negotiations management either continues to react with resilience 
through manipulation tactics or opens up a moral reasoning process depending on unions' 
bargaining position and concessions as well as on the management approach to labor 
relations. (5) Finally, an agreement is reached which then opens up the space for further (re-
)negotiations and debates as the implementation of the agreement is tested, evaluated, and 
monitored. From there on, a new iteration – somewhat equivalent to the starting phase – starts 
on a very different ground. 
In all of our 12 cases, initiating GFA negotiations has been particularly difficult and 
demanding, since management and labor actors begin with very different perceptions about 
the need for global labor standards in the first place (Fichter et al. 2011). On the union side, a 
consent formation process is already required in that the GUFs convince their affiliates of the 
adequacy of a company-based policy process for dealing with violations of core ILO labor 
standards (see also Hammer, 2005; Papadakis, 2011; Croucher & Cotton, 2009). On the level 
of individual MNCs, management reacted with tactics of defiance such as criticizing GFAs as 
a tool or claiming voluntary CSR initiatives to be sufficient in all but one of our cases. A 
change in managerial reluctance typically occurred only after several rounds of reiteration 
between the parties, somewhere between 6 months and several years.  
 
4.2 Typical Trajectories of Legitimation Strategies 
We can identify essentially three different trajectories of legitimation strategies across 
our sample of 12 MNCs: (1) a trajectory of responsibility-taking, in which MNCs adopt active 
measures to implement core labor standards across their supply chains (e.g. ChemCorp, 
documented in Helfen and Sydow, 2013; Fichter et al. 2011); (2) a trajectory of responsibility 
delegating and shifting, in which MNCs selectively respond to stakeholder demands (e.g. 
MetalCorp, documented in Helfen and Sydow, 2013; Helfen and Fichter 2013; Fichter et al. 
2011); and (3) a trajectory of responsibility avoiding, in which there is a hollow agreement 
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(Helfen and Sydow, 2013) followed by almost no active implementation activities (e.g. 
ResourceCorp, documented in Helfen and Sydow, 2013; Fichter et al. 2011).  
 
Table 3: Classification of cases and outcomes 
Avoiding responsibility ResourceCorp, BWI, France  
RubberCorp, IndustriAll, Germany 
BuildCorp, BWI, Germany 
MaterialCorp, IndustriAll, Germany 
 
Delegating and shifting 
responsibility 
ConCorp, BWI, Scandinavia 
WireCorp, IndustriAll, Germany 
FurnCorp, BWI, Germany 
CarCorp, IndustriAll, Germany 
MetalCorp, IndustriAll, Germany 
PapCorp, IndustriAll, Scandinavia 
 
Taking responsibility ChemCorp, IndustriAll, France 
PenCorp, BWI, Germany  
 
These trajectories did not evolve in a linear way, but were carried forward by different 
situational opportunity structures and legitimation strategies on various levels. Table 3 places 
each of our cases within one of these three trajectories. 
 
Figure 1: Trajectories of changes in legitimation strategies 
 
17 
Delegating and shifting responsibility 
The most common trajectory is the middle one in Figure 1, leading from initial management 
defiance towards engagement in moral reasoning with labor stakeholders, converting to 
selective adaptation of stakeholder demands and resulting finally in the delegation and 
shifting of responsibility where possible (6 MNCs). Here, the GFAs tend to outline specific 
implementation policies and escalation procedures, but exemplary good practices and 
initiatives in some areas are accompanied by passivity and neglect in others. For example, 
formalized mechanisms of monitoring and conflict resolution set up by MNCs might not be 
extended to all facilities. Swedish-based PapCorp is an exemplar of this phenomenon: the 
agreement's implementation is outstanding in one of its North American divisions, where an 
exceptional multi-plant collective agreement with the United Steelworkers has been signed, 
but implementation is weak in other business divisions and countries. For instance, in 
Colombia there appears to be a problem with PapCorp shifting responsibility for the 
agreement’s implementation to the management team of a joint venture: 
"We have some problems sometimes, but we can't say that PapCorp is the primary 
trouble maker, because PapCorp is involved in joint ventures in different parts of the 
world, especially in Latin America, in a country like Colombia. And sometimes we get 
rumours, more or less, that maybe this joint venture company is not following (...). They 
don't accept the establishing of trade unions. But we have no proof, and we can't find 
people who want to come forward and say: 'I lost my job because I tried to organize a 
new trade union'." (PapCorp, union at headquarter) 
 
As mentioned, good policies may also be thwarted by MNC passivity, as exemplified by 
German-based WireCorp.  WireCorp is a relatively small MNC, but has a high number of 
global locations.  As such, the European works council (with support from the union 
operating at WireCorp's headquarter) has been labor's leading agreement negotiator "in the 
spirit of constructive and co-operative conflict management" (WireCorp GFA). However, 
management has called the agreement a "joint declaration" and has insisted on its legally non-
binding character: 
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"That is a declaration, but not an agreement, and it has been coordinated consensually 
with the EWC, but not negotiated." (WireCorp, headquarter management) 
 
The works council responded to this with a concessionary bargaining style triggering some 
objections from the union at WireCorp's headquarter location:  
"At WireCorp, we have a weak works council. And we have many non-unionized sites 
or sites with weak unions. Against this background one sometimes asks: 'Is it worth 
putting all that effort and energy into negotiating a GFA?’" (WireCorp, union at 
headquarter) 
 
Nevertheless, the same union representative admits that complaint handling produces at least 
some results:  
 
"(...) for example, we had reports from unions trying to organize at two locations in 
Romania. The unions tried to get in, but were blocked by local management. We put 
this issue on the table in the EWC meetings with central management. And finally, the 
local unions were able to organize these plants." (WireCorp,  union at headquarter) 
 
In fact, many German and Scandinavian MNEs follow this trajectory. In these countries, labor 
representation at the headquarters is strongly institutionalized and labor relations tend to be 
cooperative as state regulation is supportive of union rights strengthening the overall 
bargaining power of labor actors.  In some cases, labor representatives are even co-opted into 
a position of co-management (see next section). In such cases, management initially tries to 
defy the GFA for the reasons mentioned above, but unions continue to exert pressure until, 
eventually, corporate elites engage in moral reasoning to accommodate and pacify external 
demands interactively.  
 
Avoiding responsibility 
The second most common trajectory is one that leads from defiance towards the use of 
manipulation strategies, resulting ultimately in avoidance of responsibility (4 MNEs). 
Essentially, management in these cases strategically drafts a GFA with the aim of avoiding 
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open opposition, but uses various manipulation tactics to avoid an actual change in behavior. 
For example, we find cases in which management successfully restricted the scope of the 
agreements by declaring direct control of operations as a necessary precondition, directly 
excluding joint ventures, majority and minority investments and sub-contractors. In such 
cases, the GFA is not typically integrated in an MNC’s sourcing policy and no responsibility 
is taken for (deviant) partners in business relationships (e.g. ResourceCorp, BuildCorp). 
Furthermore, management often manipulated the scope of an agreement by defining local 
customs and regulations as a restricting condition. This approach is well illustrated in the case 
of ResourceCorp (cf. Helfen and Sydow, 2013): 
"It is not our responsibility to operate our sub-contractors. We are not to interfere with 
the business management of our sub-contractors or either it won't be sub-contracting but 
ResourceCorp." (ResourceCorp, headquarter management 1) 
 
In other cases, the procedure of complaint handling is underspecified, ad hoc, and informal. 
This shifts the burden of proof of violations to the unions and opens up leeway for postponing 
the resolution of problems that emerge. Where neither a formal procedure nor clear-cut 
organizational accountability for the GFA is defined, the agreement cannot be put into 
practice locally without difficulty. 
Strategic manipulation by corporate elites provides the basis for a weak agreement that 
delegates responsibility. One path in this direction may be a headquarter-level social 
partnership in which labor representatives are co-opted as co-managers and the management 
effectively only negotiates with these representatives (e.g., worker representatives on the 
supervisory board or works councils) thereby excluding labor actors like GUFs' local 
affiliates, which might be more sensitive to local problems (e.g. BuildCorp). Another 
manipulation tactic is a paternalistic strategy typical for family-owned firms that claim 
responsibility for their own actions and neutralize critique by emphasizing how needs are 
taken care of by a traditional distribution of rights and responsibilities (e.g. ResourceCorp, 
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RubberCorp). In such cases, the management approach to independent labor representation is 
characterized by adversarialism, even if mechanisms of labor voice are strongly 
institutionalized at the headquarters' location as in countries such as Germany or France. 
Manipulation tactics such as deploying disunity among labor actors or inadequately 
informing, communicating, and educating subsidiary managers on the contents of the GFA 
allow corporate elites to maintain internal processes in their extant form in this trajectory. 
Management signals compliance through the guise of a formal GFA, but shields core 
activities from external evaluation. By not refusing the GFA, corporate elites establish 
themselves symbolically as the legitimate actor to influence, control, or monitor the regulation 
of corporate activities, but effectively circumvent the moral reasoning challenge.  
 
Taking responsibility 
A much more unusual trajectory is that of direct engagement in a moral reasoning process 
when faced with a GFA, resulting in a strong agreement and actual behavior change. A good 
illustration for a trajectory marked by high cooperation in legitimation strategies is that of 
French ChemCorp in the domain of IndustriAll.  Here, the initiative to sign a GFA is actually 
a joint activity by management and unions, because management seeks to increase its 
responsibility with regard to CSR issues (Fichter et al. 2011). In this case, we can say that 
management has long engaged in moral reasoning with employee representatives and has 
developed a highly collaborative labor relations culture at the headquarters characterized by 
strong unions. Also, the German PenCorp in the domain of the BWI is a good example of a 
responsibility-taking trajectory. In contrast to ChemCorp, PenCorp is a committed family-
owned company that takes responsibility for its global production as the following quote 
illustrates:  
"There are many firms having a voluntary Code of Conduct, but usually without any 
external control. For me, the tendency is clear that external ratification and control is the 
future. And CSR must not be allowed to be a mere 'strategy', for PR or marketing. We 
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need to face the issue head on. From the start, CSR must be top-down in the sense that 
the CEO, the company's leadership takes the issue to heart, otherwise it simply does not 
work." (PenCorp, headquarter management) 
 
In both cases management has positively and constructively reacted to a union initiative for a 
GFA. In the case of PenCorp, well-organized labor representatives reviewed production sites 
across the world and reported that some sites in Brazil and Asia have very high social 
standards. Upon this report, the suggestion to improve the situation for all production sites 
based on the ILO-standards was immediately welcomed by management.  
 
4.3 Opportunity Structures for Different Trajectories 
These trajectories are influenced by the ways in which contesting actors enacted their 
institutional environments, relationships, or symbolic resources in the political struggle. Most 
GFAs to date are European, so the institutionally embedded tradition of employee 
participation and representation at the country of the headquarter location is an important 
factor for getting MNCs to the negotiation table. Specifically, continental European MNEs 
like Scandinavian, German, or French MNCs have been more likely to negotiate GFAs than 
Anglo-Saxon or Southern European MNCs so far, not to mention MNCs from the Americas 
or Asia. At the same time, there are important differences between the strategies of GFA-
signing MNCs from the same country, so this institutional background does not automatically 
precondition a certain kind of trajectory. Rather, the way labor actors use their institutionally 
granted power resources in specific interactions at the MNC headquarters can effect change in 
legitimation strategies.  
Forming and upholding unity among the various labor actors seeking involvement in the 
GFA process both on the national and transnational level was important for limiting the scope 
for manipulation. Again, this condition is not static, but develops in the context of specific 
interactions and actor constellations.   
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Within the interaction process, unions typically had to accept the dominant influence of 
MNC headquarter management. They did so through discursive position-taking exemplified 
by consciously excluding controversial substantive issues like global differentials in wages 
and material working conditions, even though these were important for explaining unions’ 
motivations to have a GFA in the first place. Similarly, the issue of how to finance 
implementation was also taken out of negotiations. Such contested issues would have fuelled 
the fears of their management counterparts about the potential risks of GFAs as a new 
regulatory instrument. In turn, concessions from the union side made it easier for corporate 
elites to change their initial resistance, but also opened many doors for opportunistic behavior, 
most importantly by manipulating agreements' jurisdictions and decoupling the stated 
intentions from actual behavior.  
The final test of the credibility of corporate elites occurs when violations of the 
agreement are brought to headquarter-level review meetings for discussion. Our evidence 
indicates that headquarter unions already leading the labor camp at the GFA negotiation stage 
are also capable of taking up controversial issues and bringing them to the table for effective 
resolution of later-stage violations, although a more longitudinal perspective is necessary to 
differentiate structural from situational factors in this observation.  
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
We have set out to examine changes in the legitimation strategies corporate elites use in 
response to challenges from societal actors in the field of transnational labor regulation. An 
analysis of different trajectories of legitimation allows us to elaborate on the combination of 
strategies and their variability over time. We hereby go beyond existing approaches that study 
how organizations, and in particular the management of large corporations, deal with 
conflicting institutional demands (e.g. Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache and Santos, 2010). 
More concretely, we compare how different MNCs respond to one moral reasoning challenge 
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– here, the request to sign a GFA and implement ILO core labor standards across global 
operations – and the resulting interactions. We have identified three ‘typical’ trajectories of 
changes in legitimation strategies carried forward by the enactment of relational and 
institutional opportunity structures in sequences of interactions between elites and challenging 
groups.  
 Applying the conceptual framework of corporate legitimation strategies developed by 
Scherer and colleagues (2013) we suggest several refinements. First, we observe that in the 
case of GFAs the initial choice and change of legitimation strategies depends less on the 
calculated cost of required organizational change or the heterogeneity of demands exhibited 
by different actors operating within divergent institutional environments, and more on the 
extent to which challenger groups – trade unions, their confederative bodies, advocacy and 
charity NGOs, local governments, national policy agencies, and international organizations – 
are able to collaboratively hold corporate elites accountable across institutional distances 
(Kostova, 1999). The lack of transnational union collaboration, for instance, was a clear 
prerequisite for corporate voluntarism or manipulation in countries with weak industrial 
relations institutions. Generally, the slowly growing, but still very limited spread of GFAs as 
a regulatory instrument can be attributed to a lack of resources, unclear communication 
channels, and political or ideological disagreements among the various actors from the labor 
side, which make such a transnational union collaboration difficult to form in the first place 
(for a general treatment, see Anner, 2009). On a global level, GUFs are relatively small 
organizations compared to MNCs. On a national level, the influence of labor actors at MNC 
headquarters varies strongly between countries, sectors, and even individual companies. Such 
variations provide the background against which interactions between corporate elites and 
challenging actors unfold – and influence the extent to which the GFA process is open to 
corporate maneuvering. 
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Given this situation, the few cases where GFAs led to a profound strategy change from 
voluntarism to responsibility-taking can be attributed less to the powerful, united counter-
force exhibited by trade unions, and more to a preexisting receptivity of corporate elites to 
collaborate with unions on issues such as good labor practices. The much more common 
scenario, however, is that corporate elites de facto avoid engaging in a moral reasoning 
process by symbolically adopting a GFA that is weak and unspecific so that ultimately they 
are not held accountable for poor labor standards. Thus, second, we conclude that the 
propensity for the efficacy of a moral reasoning strategy regarding sustainability issues may 
be overestimated by Scherer and colleagues (Palazzo and Scherer, 2006; Scherer et al., 2013). 
By being able to shape the ‘material’ content of regulations (i.e. in our case GFAs) in the 
process of bargaining with labor representatives, corporate elites can combine a discursive, 
moral reasoning process with a selective adaptation towards norms emerging collectively 
within a certain sector. Legitimacy remains important even in cases when management 
applies manipulation tactics such as restricting the scope of the agreement or leaving 
implementation measures unspecified and avoiding moral reasoning altogether. Which 
strategy is chosen depends strongly on the history of labor relations in particular MNCs 
embedded in particular sectors and countries.  
Third, the existence of heterogeneous demands for sustainability highlighted by Scherer 
and colleagues (2013) not only constitutes a challenge to, but also a resource for corporate 
elites. The existence of alternative regulatory instruments such as voluntary Codes of 
Conduct, for instance, allow many MNCs to avoid engaging in a GFA process altogether. 
Thus, the more regulatory arenas are opened up and regime complexity increases (Quack, 
2013), the more corporate elites can play different initiatives and stakeholder groups against 
each other so as to defend their legitimacy by symbolically adapting to some demands, while 
declaring that others are unjustified. Such strategies are particularly relevant in legally 
ambiguous regulatory fields around the “fictitious commodities” of land, labor and money 
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(Polyani, 1944) where implementation into national politics is typically weak or 
heterogeneous and interactions among elites and challenger groups form in multiple arenas 
and around multiple regulatory issues (e.g. Keophae and Victor, 2011).  
GFAs` effectiveness depends heavily on enforcement, which in turn is influenced by the 
endurance of countervailing social groups on both national and transnational levels. In our 
study, the variability of corporate legitimation strategies points to a forceful legacy of national 
arenas and issue fields in which “old” legitimation strategies such as manipulation and 
decoupling are still effective – unless challenger groups find opportunities to mobilize a 
collective stakeholder effort on the transnational level that actually puts elites “on trial.” 
Given that such transnational coordination among challenger groups is required to 
create mutually reinforcing pressure on corporate elites from "above" and  "below" (Keck and 
Sikking, 1998), further research is needed to analyze conflicts in anti-corporate mobilization 
(cf. Kraemer et al., 2013). Further research and models on legitimation strategies should also 
take different levels of analysis more decidedly into account. In particular, the sectoral level 
on which norms and practices converge cross-nationally seems to be highly relevant as a unit 
of analysis. While we expect that legitimation strategies dynamically change through 
interaction with challenger groups also in other transnational regulatory fields such as the 
global trade regime forming around the WTO, the trajectories may be different depending on 
the strength of enforcement mechanisms behind regulations, the legal ambiguity of 
regulations or regime complexity, and the patterns of coordination and collaboration among 
challenging groups nationally and transnationally.  
Scherer and colleagues (2013) raise the question of how long manipulation strategies 
are sustainable. In our case, ongoing stakeholder pressure may well cause another shift in the 
legitimation strategy of corporate elites that are currently on a “weak” trajectory sustained 
through manipulation. Finally, it must be recognized that corporate elites are willing to risk 
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being perceived as illegitimate and, in some instances, use non-legitimate, non-legal 
instruments and other instruments from the sphere of direct force and domination.  
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